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• IDSes produce a lot of alarms.
• Administrators are overwhelmed
with non-critical alarms.
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Introduction
Alarm Classes
Non-critical alarms are not indicative of a plausible threat.
Normal
Events MaliciousEvents
Event Space
Non-Critical Alarm: A false positive (alarm related to normal background traffic)
or a non-relevant positive (alarm related to an unsuccessful attack attempt).
• They pose two problems:
– Distract security officers from real threats.
– Prevent automatically blocking attacks.
IDS Context F. Gagnon @ DIMVA’09 4 / 23
Introduction
Alarm Classes
Non-critical alarms are not indicative of a plausible threat.
Normal
Events MaliciousEvents
Successful
Attacks
Event Space
Non-Critical Alarm: A false positive (alarm related to normal background traffic)
or a non-relevant positive (alarm related to an unsuccessful attack attempt).
• They pose two problems:
– Distract security officers from real threats.
– Prevent automatically blocking attacks.
IDS Context F. Gagnon @ DIMVA’09 4 / 23
Introduction
Alarm Classes
Non-critical alarms are not indicative of a plausible threat.
Normal
Events MaliciousEvents
IDS
Alarms
Successful
Attacks
Event Space
Non-Critical Alarm: A false positive (alarm related to normal background traffic)
or a non-relevant positive (alarm related to an unsuccessful attack attempt).
• They pose two problems:
– Distract security officers from real threats.
– Prevent automatically blocking attacks.
IDS Context F. Gagnon @ DIMVA’09 4 / 23
Introduction
Alarm Classes
Non-critical alarms are not indicative of a plausible threat.
Normal
Events MaliciousEvents
IDS
Alarms
Successful
Attacks
TN FP FNTPNRP
LFN
Event Space
Non-Critical Alarm: A false positive (alarm related to normal background traffic)
or a non-relevant positive (alarm related to an unsuccessful attack attempt).
• They pose two problems:
– Distract security officers from real threats.
– Prevent automatically blocking attacks.
IDS Context F. Gagnon @ DIMVA’09 4 / 23
Introduction
Using Contextual Information
• An attack succeeds only when several conditions are met.
• As soon as 1 condition is not respected, the attack fails.
• Using the attack context, we can identify some of those that will fail.
• Several types of contextual information:
– Network (topology and protocols)
– Attack side effect (returned messages and log files)
– Vulnerability assessment
– Target configuration (operating system and applications)
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Introduction
Objectives
• Potential:
Is target configuration an effective piece of contextual information to clas-
sify IDS alarms ?
• Current:
Are the existing tools good enough to gather this context automatically ?
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Experiment Setup
Dataset
• Using freely available attack dataset from CRC [2]
• 5,761 traces (1 trace ⇒ 1 attack attempt ⇒ 1 alarm)
• No background traffic
• 92 exploits
– Covering 47 vulnerabilities (BIDs)
– Targeting 18 ports (TCP and UDP)
• 95 targets (34 BSD, 25 Linux, 36 Windows)
• Well-documented
– Target OS and App
– Attack result (success/failure)
– Snort alarms
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Experiment Setup
Evaluation Process - Potential
•Target IP
•Target OS
•Target App
•Attack Outcome
(Success\failure)
Trace Info
--------------
IDS Alarm
--------------
•Target IP
•BID
•BID
•Vuln products
•Non-vuln products
Bugtraq
--------------
•Target OS
•Target App
•Vuln products
•Non-vuln products
Automatic Verification
--------------
•Result 
(correct\incorrect)
Automatic Classification
--------------
•Class 
(non-critical\attempt)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
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Experiment Setup
Evaluation Process - Tools
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Experiment Setup
Classification Algorithms
ContextOS:
(1) if the target OS is listed as non-vulnerable for this exploit, return NC
(2) if the target OS is not listed as vulnerable for the BID and
(2.1) if all the products listed as vulnerable are OSes, return NC
(3) return A
ContextApp: considers only application
ContextOSApp: considers both OS and App
ContextOSDeduction: considers only OS and deduce some App info from OS
. (e.g., Microsoft IIS cannot run on a Linux computer)
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Performance Measures
Recall =
# of non-critical alarms classified as NC
# of non-critical alarms
=
α
α+ γ
Precision =
# of non-critical alarms classified as NC
# of alarms classified as NC
=
α
α+ β
Alarm
Non-critical Critical
Classification
NC α β
A γ δ
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Results
Target Configuration Potential
Assuming we know the exact target configuration (OS and App)
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• Errors (precision decrease) are due to missing entries on securityfocus.
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Results
OSD Tools
Using the ContextOSDeduction algorithm
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• Current OSD tools are not nearly good enough (13% vs 40%).
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Results
AppD Tools
Using the ContextApp algorithm
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• How can Nmap be better than the ideal case (27% vs 23%)?
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Results
Weird Results
Suppose the target application (Microsoft IIS FTP) is vulnerable to the attack, but
the attack fails anyway (thus it is non-critical):
• The alarm is classified A by ContextApp with exact knowledge.
• This means 0/1 for recall.
Suppose Nmap thinks the target application is wuftpd (not vulnerable):
• The alarm is now classified NC by ContextApp with Nmap.
• This means 1/1 for recall.
Those mistakes should result in a decrease of precision for Nmap (successful attack
misclassified as NC).
The dataset does not have enough successful attacks.
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Conclusion
Discussion
• Target configuration is very useful for IDS context:
– Filtering 73% of non-critical alarms.
– Not filtering critical alarms.
• OSD tools are not adequate to gather the required contextual information
(they achieve only 1/3 of potential).
• There is a possibility for an attacker to manipulate the context, by injecting
traffic.
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Conclusion
Future Work
• Compare the effectiveness of the different IDS context elements (e.g., vulnera-
bility assessment with Nessus vs target configuration vs attack side effect).
• Develop a new OS discovery approach (HOSDa) [1].
– Detect manipulation attempts on the context.
• Re-run the experiment on another dataset.
ahttp://hosd.sourceforge.net
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Questions
fgagnon@sce.carleton.ca
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Extra
Comparing HOSD
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